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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a two-echelon sustainable supply chain with price-sensitive
demand. The government taxes the carbon footprint of each item caused by producing, transporting,
and consuming the products. Both the supplier and retailer can exert efforts to reduce the carbon
footprint. In a non-cooperative setting, the government only taxes the supplier, so that the retailer has
no incentive to exert any effort to reduce the carbon footprint and the supplier merely decides on the
selling price to maximize its own profit. We develop a centralized supply chain and show that there
is an optimal solution to maximize the channel profit. Since the centralized policy may not be always
not practical, we propose a tax-sharing contract, where both parties profit from the carbon footprint
reduction. This problem is modeled as the Stackelberg game and Nash game. The results show that
the leader has more power than the follower, which results in more profit. The Stackelberg game
provides boundaries for both parties’ profits in the Nash game. Although the tax-sharing contract
does not result in full cooperation, its efficiency is still much higher than that of the non-cooperative
case. The results are illustrated with some numerical experiments.
Keywords: game theory; sustainable supply chain; carbon footprint; government intervention
1. Introduction
With increased environmental consciousness over the past decade, environmental issues
(e.g., global warming, desertification, and acid rain pollution) have become a major concern in
industry. Industrial organizations which are involved in sourcing, manufacturing, and transportation
should show responsibility towards these problems. However, the typical objectives of most
enterprises in a supply chain are to maximize corporate profits and not to reduce pollution.
Therefore, the involvement of governments plays a leading role in the environmental protection
agenda. Many governments have already enacted green legislation and used financial activities (e.g.,
green taxation and subsidies) for environmental protection. For example, in 2005, the European Union
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) was launched to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2013, the
EU ETS had been operated by more than 11,000 factories, power stations, and other installations in
31 countries (all 28 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein). In September 2013,
the European Commission announced a new environmental policy “Communication on Building the
Single Market for Green Products”. Its main principle is to evaluate each product’s greenness by one
single criterion, known as Product Environmental Footprint (PEF), whose core approach is Life Cycle
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Assessment (LCA). According to the European Commission, LCA is an internationally-standardized
assessment method, which evaluates the environmental burdens and resources consumed along the
lifecycle of the product. On the other hand, government intervention, such as taxation and subsidies,
can affect the market structure and change the relative market competitiveness, which may even
lead to a market reshuffle. To this end, government intervention should be made from a sustainable
supply-chain management prospective. The integration of the supply chain has been proved as
an effective way to increase the channel profit and efficiency, which could also be the solution to
sustainable supply chain management. In this paper, we develop a mathematical model to analyze
the eco-efficiency of sustainable supply chains with different cooperation policies under the carbon
footprint tax. In the following, we briefly review the relevant literature.
In supply chain management, cooperation is along the supply chain by the coordination between
the different parties along the supply chain. Goyal [1] was the first to propose an integrated inventory
model with a single-supplier and a single-retailer setting to solve the joint economic lot-sizing problem.
Weng [2] used the quantity discount policy to reduce the supplier’s cost and increase the retailer’s
demand when the demand is price-sensitive. Huang and Li [3] used game theory to investigate the
efficiency of transactions in a manufacturer-retailer co-op advertising supply chain. Viswanathan
and Wang [4] proposed quantity discounts and volume discounts as coordination mechanisms
in a single-vendor, single-retailer distribution channel with a price-sensitive demand. Sarkar [5]
considered a single vendor and single buyer channel coordination mechanism for fixed life products.
The vendor required the buyer to change the order quantity and compensated the buyer by offering
a quantity discount, so that both players could benefit from coordination.
Recently, with increasing consciousness of environmental protection, the enterprises in supply
chains have been putting more effort to implement environmental practices. For this reason, sustainable
supply chain management has been studied extensively in the recent literature. Environmental impacts
occur through the whole life cycle of a product, from raw material purchasing, to manufacturing, usage,
recycling, and disposal. Thus, all of the enterprises in a supply chain should be responsible for pollution
control [6]. Sheu et al. [7] proposed a linear multi-objective programming model to manage integrated
forward and used-product reverse logistics in a green supply chain. Geldermann et al. [8] used Pinch
analysis to study a bicycle company in China, whose objective is to combine different measurements
and investigate the overall optimization potential of different process design options. Ferretti et al. [9]
developed a model to evaluate the economic and environmental effects of an aluminum supply
chain, which examined the concerns about transportation pollution, the manufacturing processes,
and recycling. Abdallah et al. [10] proposed a mixed-integer programming model to find the trade-off
between costs and respective emissions in a green supply chain. Sarkar et al. [11] developed
a three-echelon supply chain with the consideration of transportation and carbon emission cost
and the model aimed to reduce the supply chain cost by choosing the best transportation method.
The studies mentioned in the previous paragraph assume that the implementations of
environmental practices are in one enterprise or in a cooperative supply chain. However, as the entities
in a supply chain may belong to different parties, the crux of the problem lies in the coordination of their
activities to enable the implementation of sustainable supply chain management. Effective and efficient
cooperation policies need to be developed to tackle this issue. There are several papers that deal with
cooperation in sustainable, supply-chain-management settings. Sheu [12] addressed a bargaining
framework between producers and reverse-logistics suppliers under government intervention, which
seeks equilibrium negotiation solutions for supply chain members. Barari et al. [13] developed a game
theoretical model to maximize the producer’s and retailer’s economic profits by leveraging upon the
product’s greenness. Ghosh and Shah [14] developed a game theoretical model to analyze how greening
levels, prices, and profit are influenced by supply chain structures. Corbett and DeCroix [15] proposed
a shared-saving contracts model for chemicals purchasing, which aims to reduce the consumption of
indirect materials and maximize the supplier’s and retailer’s profits.
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However, these previous studies did not develop mathematical models to analyze the market
impacts and eco-efficiency under government intervention in a sustainable supply chain. In this
paper, we model cooperation structures in a sustainable supply chain where both parties undertake
carbon footprint reduction initiatives, and study the effects of both pricing strategies and government
intervention. It is assumed that the government charges a tax on each item’s carbon footprint. Then we
analyze the supplier’s and retailer’s reactions in a non-cooperative and a fully cooperative supply
chain. As the non-cooperative supply chain is sub-optimal and the fully cooperative supply chain is not
always practical, we propose a tax-sharing contract, which can make both parties benefit from a carbon
footprint reduction. The numerical experiments are presented to demonstrate the proposed model.
2. Model Formulation for the Sustainable Supply Chain
In this section, we use a mathematical model to analyze the relationship between the profits of
the supplier and the retailer and maximize both of their profits. In our setting, the supplier provides
a single product to the retailer, who is faced with a price-sensitive demand. The government charges
a tax on the carbon footprint of each product, caused by producing, transporting, and consuming the
product. With supply chain cooperation, the supplier and retailer both exert effort to reduce the carbon
footprint so as to reduce the tax charged by the government.
2.1. Notations and Assumptions
The following assumptions and notations are used through the whole paper. Additional
assumptions and notations are introduced when required.
The following notation is used throughout the paper:
p selling price per unit (decision variable)
c production cost per unit
t tax on the carbon footprint per unit
β supplier’s margin (the retailer’s margin is 1´ β)
es effort exerted by supplier to reduce carbon footprint, 0 ď es ď 1 (decision variable)
er effort exerted by retailer to reduce carbon footprint, 0 ď er ď 1 (decision variable)
zpes, erq carbon footprint per unit (0 ď zpes, erq ď 1) with respect to effort es and er
cspesq supplier’s cost to reduce carbon footprint of each item with respect to effort es
crperq retailer’s cost to reduce carbon footprint of each item with respect to effort er
Assumptions:
(1) The inventory is reviewed periodically and the period length is constant.
(2) The demand (D) in each period is dependent on the selling price (p), which is decided by the
retailer, and has a relationship in the form D “ a´ bp.
(3) The lead time is zero and shortages are not allowed.
(4) The government charges tax on the carbon footprint of each item.
(5) The carbon footprint caused by producing, transporting, and consuming the product is a function
of the supplier’s and retailer’s effort levels. Without loss of generality, let zp0, 0q “ 1. More effort
leads to less carbon footprint, i.e., Bzpes, erq{Bes ď 0, Bzpes, erq{Ber ď 0. Let zpes, erq be twice
continuously differentiable on [0, 1] ˆ [0, 1]. The returns are decreasing as the effort grows, i.e.,
B2zpes, erq{Bes2 ě 0, B2zpes, erq{Ber2 ě 0. We also assume that zpes, erq is supermodular in pes, erq,
i.e., B2zpes, erq{BesBer ě 0.
(6) It costs cspesq and crperq for the supplier and retailer to exert the efforts es and er, respectively.
cspesq and crperq are both twice continuously differentiable on [0, 1]. More effort leads to a higher
cost, i.e., cs1pesq ě 0, cr1perq ě 0, and both parties’ initial marginal costs of effort are negligible,
c1sp0q “ 0 and c1rp0q “ 0. cspesq and crperq are also convex in es and er, respectively, i.e., cs2 pesq ě 0,
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cr2 perq ě 0. Finally, we assume lim
esÑ1
pc1spesqq “ limerÑ1pc
1
rperqq “ 8. Although this assumption is not
strictly necessary, it can help to define the range of es and er.
(7) In this research, we focus on both parties’ reactions on carbon footprint tax, but not the distribution
of profits. We further assume that without coordination the supplier’s margin is β. Under the
tax-sharing contract, the supplier’s margin is β1.
2.2. Decentralized Supply Chain
In general, without cooperation, the government only charges the tax to the supplier. When the
two parties of the supply chain make decisions individually, the retailer has no incentive to exert any
effort to reduce the carbon footprint. Therefore, er “ 0 and crperq “ 0.
In such a situation, the retailer’s profit is given by:
pir “ pa´ bpqpp´ cqp1´ βq ´ crperqpa´ bpq
“ pa´ bpqpp´ cqp1´ βq (1)
It can be shown from (1) that B2pir{Bp2 “ ´2bp1´ βq ă 0, which indicates that pir is a concave
function of p. By setting Bpir{Bp “ 0, the optimal price can be obtained and is as follows:
p˚ “ a` bc
2b
(2)
By substituting p into (1), the optimal retailer’s profit is:
pir
˚ “ 1
4
pa´ bcqp a
b
´ cq (3)
In this situation, the supplier’s profit is:
pis “ pa´ bpqpp´ cqβ´ ptzpes, erq ` cspesqqpa´ bpq (4)
With p˚ “ a`bc2b and er “ 0, the supplier’s profit becomes:
pis “ 14 pa´ bcqpa´ cqβ´
1
2
ptzpes, 0q ` cspesqqpa´ bcq (5)
Taking the second partial derivative of pis with respect to es, we get:
B2pis
Bes2
“ ´1
2
pa´ bcqptB
2zpes, 0q
Bes2
` cs2 pesqq ă 0 (6)
The optimal es can be obtained by setting the first partial derivative of pis to zero:
Bpis
Bes “ ´
1
2
pa´ bcqptBzpes, 0qBes ` cs
1pesqq “ 0 (7)
Since a´ bc ą 0, it can be obtained that:
cs1pesq “ ´tBzpes, 0qBes (8)
2.3. Centralized Supply Chain
In this section, suppose the supplier and retailer set up a joint company and make decisions
together to maximize the channel profit. In this situation, the channel’s profit is given by:
pic “ pis ` pir “ pa´ bpqpp´ c´ tzpes, erq ´ cspesq ´ crperqq (9)
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First, by taking the second partial derivative of pic with respect to p, we get:
B2pic
Bp2 “ ´2b ă 0 (10)
Then, by taking the first partial derivative of pic with respect to p, we get:
Bpic
Bp “ ´bpp´ c´ tzpes, erq ´ cspesq ´ crperqq ` a´ bp (11)
From Bpic{Bp “ 0, p can be obtained and its value is as follows:
p “ c
2
` a
2b
` 1
2
ptzpes, erq ` cspesq ` crperqq (12)
Substituting Equation (12) into Equation (9), the channel’s profit becomes:
pic “ 14 ra´ bc´ bptzpes, erq ` cspesq ` crperqqsp
a
b
´ c´ tzpes, erq ´ cspesq ´ crperqq (13)
By taking the first derivative of pis with respect to es and er, respectively, and setting it to zero,
we obtain:
BpicBes “ 14 ra´ bc´ bptzpes, erq ` cspesq ` crperqqsp´t
Bzpes ,erqBes ´ cs1pesqq
` 14 p´bt Bzpes ,erqBes ´ bcs1pesqqp ab ´ c´ tzpes, erq ´ cspesq ´ crperqq “ 0
(14)
BpicBer “ 14 ra´ bc´ bptzpes, erq ` cspesq ` crperqqsp´t
Bzpes ,erqBer ´ cr1perqq
` 14 p´bt Bzpes ,ecqBer ´ bcr1perqqp ab ´ c´ tzpes, erq ´ cspesq ´ crperqq “ 0
(15)
From Equations (14) and (15), we obtain necessary conditions for obtaining the maximum pic:
cs1pesq “ ´tBzpes, erqBes (16)
cr1perq “ ´tBzpes, erqBer (17)
By comparing Equations (16) and (17) with Equation (8), we can see that in the decentralized
supply chain, the supplier exerts excessive effort and the retailer exerts no effort, which makes the
decentralized supply chain inefficient. The centralized supply chain requires that both parties invest
a certain proportion to reduce the carbon footprint and then divide the surplus profit reasonably.
In practice, it is usually difficult to implement. For this reason, in the next section, we propose a more
practically feasible contract.
2.4. Shared-Tax Contract
Since the decentralized supply chain is not efficient and the centralized supply chain is not quite
practical, we propose a tax-sharing contract that could make both parties benefit from the carbon
footprint reduction. Unlike the centralized supply chain policy, the supplier and the retailer do not
engage in a deep collaborative process in the new contract. Under the tax-sharing contract, the supplier
requires the retailer to pay a certain proportion of the tax (denoted by β1, which is the only component
in addition to those in the decentralized supply chain setting), while the retailer could also benefit
from the tax breaks. By doing so, the supplier and the retailer could come to an agreement easily.
Both parties make a decision according to the proportion of the tax and the other’s choice. So a Nash
game and Stackelberg game are used to model the relationship between the profits of the two parties
according to their bargaining positions.
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Since the retailer should pay a proportion of the carbon footprint tax in the new contract, the
retailer requires a higher profit margin 1´ β1 (with β1 ă β) than in a decentralized supply chain.
The supplier and retailer’s profit functions are as follows:
pis “ pa´ bpqpp´ c´ tzpes, erqqβ1 ´ cspesqpa´ bpq (18)
pir “ pa´ bpqpp´ c´ tzpes, erqqp1´ β1q ´ crperqpa´ bpq (19)
Since one party’s decision affects the other’s, we use the Stackelberg game and Nash game to get
the optimal and equilibrium solutions.
2.4.1. Stackelberg Supplier Game
In this section, we model the relationship between the supplier and the retailer as
a non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader and the retailer as the follower.
First, we examine the retailer’s reaction in the second stage.
By taking the second partial derivative of pir with respect to p, we have:
B2pir
Bp2 “ ´2bp1´ β
1q ă 0 (20)
Since pir is concave in p, the optimal price function is determined by:
Bpir
Bp “ p1´ β
1qr´bpp´ c´ tzpes, erqq ` a´ bps ` bcrperq “ 0 (21)
From Equation (21), we have:
p “ a
2b
` c
2
` 1
2
tzpes, erq ` crperq2p1´ β1q (22)
Then we consider the retailer’s strategy. By substituting Equation (22) into Equation (19), we have:
pir “ 14 pa´ bc´ btzpes, erq ´
bcrperq
1´ β1 qrp
a
b
´ c´ tzpes, erqqp1´ β1q ´ crperqs (23)
By taking the first and second partial derivatives of pir with respect to er, we have:
BpirBer “ 14 p´bt
Bzpes ,erqBer ´
bcr 1perq
1´β1 qrp ab ´ c´ tzpes, erqqp1´ β1q ´ crperqs
` 14 pa´ bc´ btzpes, erq ´ bcrperq1´β1 qr´p1´ β1qt Bzpes ,erqBer ´ cr1perqs
(24)
B2pir
Ber2 “
1
4 p´bt B
2zpes ,erq
Ber2 ´
bcr2 perq
1´β1 qrp ab ´ c´ tzpes, erqqp1´ β1q ´ crperqs
` 14 p´bt Bzpes ,erqBer ´
bcr 1perq
1´β1 qr´p1´ β1qt Bzpes ,erqBer ´ cr1perqs
` 14 p´bt Bzpes ,erqBer ´
bcr 1perq
1´β1 qr´p1´ β1qt Bzpes ,erqBer ´ cr1perqs
` 14 pa´ bc´ btzpes, erq ´ bcrperq1´β1 qr´p1´ β1qt B
2zpes ,erq
Ber2 ´ cr2 perqs
(25)
From Equations (24) and (25), we observe that when Bpir{Ber “ 0, B2pir{Ber2 ď 0. Therefore, if the
optimal er is not at the interval boundaries, the necessary condition to maximize pir is:
cr1perq “ ´p1´ β1qtBzpes, erqBer (26)
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Thus, the problem becomes:
Max
es
pis “ pa´ bpqpp´ c´ tzpes, erqqβ1 ´ cspesqpa´ bpq
s.t. p “ a2b ` c2 ` 12 tzpes, erq ` crperq2p1´β1q
cr1perq “ ´p1´ β1qt Bzpes ,erqBer
0 ď es ď 1
(27)
Proposition 1. If the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower, then the following are true:
(i) The price is negatively correlated to the changes in the supplier’s effort and the retailer’s
profit margin.
(ii) The tax on each item is negatively and positively related to the changes in the carbon footprint
and the supplier and retailer’s effort.
(iii) The retailer’s best response function er˚pesq is decreasing in its argument.
Proof. For (i), by taking the first partial derivative of p with respect to es and er, it can be found that:
Bp
Bes “
1
2
t
Bzpes, erq
Bes ă 0 (28)
Bp
Ber “
1
2
t
Bzpes, erq
Ber `
cr1perq
2p1´ β1q (29)
From Equations (28) and (29), we finish the proof of (i).
For (ii), it follows directly from Equation (26).
For (iii), by setting the variable res “ ´es. We obtain
B2pirBerBres “ 14bt B2zpes ,erqBerBes rp ab ´ c´ tzpes, erqqp1´ β1q ´ crperqs
` 14 p´bt Bzpes ,erqBer ´
bcr 1perq
1´β1 qrp1´ β1qt Bzpes ,erqBes s
` 14bt Bzpes ,erqBes r´p1´ β1qt
Bzpes ,erqBer ´ cr1perqs
` 14 pa´ bc´ btzpes, erq ´ bcrperq1´β1 qp1´ β1qt B
2zpes ,erqBerBes
(30)
We have proved that the necessary condition to maximize pir is cr1perq “ ´p1´ β1qtBzpes, erq{Ber
and we have assumed B2zpes, erq{BesBer ě 0. Therefore, B2pir{BerBres ě 0, pir is supermodular in pres, erq.
Finally, Theorem 1.2 in Topkis [16] implies the retailer’s best response function er˚pesq is decreasing in
its argument.
2.4.2. Stackelberg Retailer Game
In practice, some big retailers may dominate the market, which makes retailers more powerful
than suppliers. In this section, we assume that the retailer is the leader and the supplier is the follower.
First, we talk about the supplier’s reaction in the second stage.
In our setting, the supplier can only decide its effort level es. By taking the second partial
derivative of pis with respect to es:
B2pis
Bes2
“ ´pa´ bpqtβ1 B
2zpes, erq
Bes2
´ cs2 pesqpa´ bpq ă 0 (31)
Since pis is concave in es, the supplier’s optimal effort strategy is determined by:
Bpis
Bes “ ´pa´ bpqtβ
1 Bzpes, erq
Bes ´ cs
1pesqpa´ bpq “ 0 (32)
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From Equation (32), we obtain:
cs1pesq “ ´tβ1 Bzpes, erqBes (33)
Then, the problem becomes:
Max
p,er
pir “ pa´ bpqpp´ c´ tzpes, erqqp1´ β1q ´ crperqpa´ bpq
s.t. cs1pesq “ ´tβ1 Bzpes ,erqBes
0 ď er ď 1
c ď p ď ab
(34)
Proposition 2. If the retailer is the leader and the supplier is the follower, then the following are true:
(i) The supplier’s effort for carbon footprint reduction is positively related to the changes in the tax
and the supplier’s profit margin.
(ii) The supplier’s best response function es˚perq is decreasing in its argument.
Proof. For (i), it can be obtained from Equation (33).
For (ii), by setting res “ ´es, we obtain:
B2pis
BresBer “ pa´ bpqβ1tB
2zpes, erq
BesBer (35)
By the assumption that B2zpes, erq{BesBer ě 0, we prove that B2pis{BresBer ě 0 and pir is
supermodular in pres, erq. Theorem 1.2 in Topkis [16] establishes (ii).
2.4.3. Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we relax the leader-follower relationship and assume that the two parties have
a symmetric relationship. Then, the two parties maximize their profit simultaneously with respect to the
other’s strategy. The solution for this game structure is the Nash equilibrium. The problem becomes:
Max
es
pis “ pa´ bpqpp´ c´ tzpes, erqqβ1 ´ cspesqpa´ bpq
s.t. 0 ď es ď 1
Max
p,er
pir “ pa´ bpqpp´ c´ tzpes, erqqp1´ β1q ´ crperqpa´ bpq
s.t. 0 ď er ď 1, c ď p ď ab
(36)
Proposition 3. If the supplier and the retailer have a non-cooperative symmetric relationship, then the following
are true:
(i) The best response function es˚perq and er˚pesq are both decreasing in er and es.
(ii) At least one equilibrium exits in the Nash game.
(iii) If there are multiple equilibriums, for any two equilibriums peˆs, eˆrq and pes, erq, they can be
ordered as eˆs ď es and eˆr ě er, or eˆs ě es and eˆr ď er. If eˆs ď es and eˆr ě er. Finally we have
pispeˆs, eˆrq ě pispes, erq and pirpeˆs, eˆrq ď pirpes, erq.
(iv) The Stackelberg supplier game offers the upper bounds of the supplier’s profit and the retailer’s
effort level, and the lower bounds of the supplier’s effort level and the retailer’s profit. Accordingly,
the Stackelberg retailer game offers the upper bounds of the retailer’s profit and the supplier’s
effort level, and the lower bounds of the retailer’s effort level and the supplier’s profit.
Proof. For (i), it has been proved in Proposition 1 (IV) and Proposition 2 (ii).
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For (ii), it follows from Theorem 3.1 in Topkis [16].
For (iii), given two equilibriums peˆs, eˆrq and pes, erq, and eˆs ď es, The retailer’s best response
function is decreasing in supplier’s effort and therefore eˆr “ er˚peˆsq ě er˚pesq “ er. Also, pispes, erq ď
pispes, eˆrq ď pispes˚peˆrqs, eˆrq “ pispeˆs, eˆrq and pirpeˆs, eˆrq ď pirpes, eˆrq ď pirpes, er˚pesqq “ pirpes, erq.
For (iv), assume es and er are the supplier’s and retailer’s effort levels obtained in the Stackelberg
supplier game. If we choose any eˆs with eˆs ă es, then the retailer will increase its effort level eˆr,
with eˆr ą er, according to Equation (26). Since the supplier’s profit is already maximized, with
pispes, erq ą pispeˆs, eˆrq, the supplier’s profit will decrease with a lower effort level. From Equation (26),
we observe that the retailer will not choose any eˆr with eˆr ą er. The proof is similar for the Stackelberg
retailer game.
3. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we carry out numerical experiments to examine both parties’ profits and the
carbon footprint under the aforementioned policies. The function of the carbon footprint produced
by each item is assumed to be zpes, erq “ p1´ esq2p1´ erq. The supplier’s and retailer’s cost functions
to reduce the carbon footprint are assumed to be as follows: cspesq “ p1´ esq´3 ´ 3es ´ 1 and
crperq “ p1´ erq´3 ´ 3er ´ 1, which have been used in Corbett and DeCroix [3]. We note that these
functions satisfy all the conditions that are proposed in the assumption.
For the function of zpes, erq, cspesq and crperq are given, and we can prove that the critical points
are local maximums in the centralized supply chain. The proofs are provided in the Appendix.
First, we will examine the supplier’s and retailer’s profits under a decentralized and a centralized
supply chain with the following values of parameters: a “ 10, b “ 0.4, c “ 5, β “ 0.6.
Figures 1 and 2 show that when the tax is only charged to the supplier in a decentralized supply
chain, tax changes do not affect the retailer’s decision and profit. The centralized supply chain can
both reduce the carbon footprint and increase the channel profit. As the tax increases, cooperation
becomes more profitable.
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Then we examine the price changes under all the policies, and the supplier’s and retailer’s profits
under the Stackelberg and Nash game with the following values of parameters: a “ 10, b “ 0.4,
c “ 5, t “ 4, β1 “ 0.5, β “ 0.6. As there are multiple equilibriums in the Nash game, we select the one
that produces the largest channel profit.
Figure 3 highlights that when the supplier is the leader, the retailer prefers to set a higher price
than the optimal price, and that the price is set lower when the retailer is the leader. This is due to the
fact that when the supplier is the leader, less effort is exerted by the supplier. For this reason, the retailer
chooses a higher price to earn more profit, and vice versa, which has been proven in Proposition 1 (i).
Although the prices are not the same under these policies, the difference is quite small, except in the
decentralized supply chain. That is because the price is only dependent on the market demand and
production cost, but not affected by the tax. As a result, the price is always lower than the optimal
price. The centralized supply chain and tax-sharing contract can limit the size of the market to within
a reasonable range and, hence, the total emission of carbon dioxide decreases under these policies.
Meanwhile, all of the policies, except the decentralized supply chain, are quite sensitive to the change
in tax. From Figures 4 and 5 we observe that the Stackelberg retailer game earns a little more channel
profit than the Stackelberg supplier game, because the retailer can decide on the selling price and,
thus, have a stronger bargaining power. Therefore, when the retailer is the leader, the supply chain
is more efficient. Figures 5 and 6 show that the Stackelberg game and Nash game only increase the
channel profit, but do not reduce the carbon footprint, compared with the decentralized supply chain.
This is because the carbon footprint function is assumed to be zpes, erq “ p1´ esq2p1´ erq, in which the
supplier’s effort is more effective. In addition, the tax is only charged to the supplier, so the supplier
exerts excessive effort without cooperation. If we assume zpes, erq “ p1´ esqp1´ erq2, then the carbon
footprint will decrease under the tax-sharing contract. For this reason, the government should tax the
party whose decision could make a more significant reduction in the carbon footprint if there is no
cooperation between the supplier and retailer. Even if the carbon footprint is not reduced, the supply
chain becomes more efficient under the tax-sharing contract.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied several cooperation policies in a sustainable supply chain.
In a non-cooperative setting, the government only charges tax to the supplier, which provides no
incentive for the retailer to reduce the carbon footprint. We also show that a centralized supply chain
that can both increase channel profit and reduce the carbon footprint. As the decentralized supply
chain is sub-optimal and the centralized supply chain is not always feasible in reality, we proposed
a tax-sharing contract. We used the Stackelberg game and Nash game to formulate the relationship
Sustainability 2016, 8, 716 12 of 13
between the supplier’s and retailer’s profits. We also found that the Stackelberg game provides the
lower and upper bounds of the profits of both parties and effort levels for the Nash game, and that
the Stackelberg retailer game is a little more efficient than the Stackelberg supplier game because
the retailer can decide on the selling price and has a stronger bargaining power. The distribution
of profit is dependent on the relative negotiation power. The decision made by the party who has
the higher negotiation power results in a higher profit, which can be shown in the Stackelberg game.
Although the tax-sharing contract cannot provide for full cooperation, its channel profit is still higher
than in the no-cooperation case.
There are several future extensions from this research. First, we will examine the effect of changing
the price-sensitive deterministic demand to stochastic demand. Second, we will also study additional
cooperation policies that might increase the channel profit and efficiency. Third, the current model
could be extended to the case where multiple suppliers and multiple retailers are involved.
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Appendix
The Hessian matrix of pic is:
H “
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇ B
2pic
Bes2
B2picBesBer
B2picBerBes
B2pic
Ber2
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇ “ B2picBes2 B
2pic
Ber2
´ p B
2pic
BesBer q
2 (A1)
In Equation (A1):
B2pic
Bes2 “
1
2b ra´ bc´ bptzpes, erq ` cspesq ` crperqqsp´t B
2zpes ,erq
Bes2 ´ c
2
s pesqq
` b2 p´t Bzpes ,ecqBes ´ cs1pesqq2
(A2)
B2pic
Ber2 “
1
2b ra´ bc´ bptzpes, erq ` cspesq ` crperqqsp´t B
2zpes ,erq
Ber2 ´ c
2
r perqq
` b2 p´t Bzpes ,erqBer ´ cs1pesqq2
(A3)
B2pic
BesBer “
1
2b
ra´ bc´ bptzpes, erq ` cspesq ` crperqqsp´tB
2zpes, erq
BesBer q (A4)
As exactly the same part exits in Equations (A2)–(A4), and ´t Bzpes ,ecqBes ´ c1spesq “ 0, ´t
Bzpes ,ecqBer ´
cr1perq “ 0, we only need to compares the parts that are different. Since the function of zpes, erq, cspesq,
and cspesq are given in the numerical example section, we obtain:
´ tB
2zpes, erq
Bes2
´ c2s pesq “ ´2tp1´ erq ´ 12p1´ esq´5 (A5)
´ tB
2zpes, erq
Ber2
´ c2r perq “ ´12p1´ erq´5 (A6)
´ tB
2zpes, erq
BesBer “ ´2tp1´ esq (A7)
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We have obtained the necessary conditions to obtain the maximum pic, which are:
cs1pesq “ ´tBzpes, erqBes “ 2tp1´ esqp1´ erq (A8)
cr1perq “ ´tBzpes, erqBer “ tp1´ esq
2 (A9)
From (A8) and (A9), we obtain es ą er. Then, we have ´t B2zpes ,erqBes2 ´ c
2
s pesq `
ˇˇˇ
´t B2zpes ,erqBesBer
ˇˇˇ
ă 0.
Hence, B2picBes2 `
ˇˇˇ B2picBesBer ˇˇˇ ă 0. If we substitute Equation (A9) into Equation (A6), we have
´t B2zpes ,erqBer2 ´ c
2
r perq `
ˇˇˇ
´t B2zpes ,erqBesBer
ˇˇˇ
ă 0. Hence, B2picBes2 `
ˇˇˇ B2picBesBer ˇˇˇ ă 0. Finally, we get the Hessian matrix
H “ B2picBes2
B2pic
Ber2 ´ p
B2picBesBer q
2 ą 0. Therefore, the critical points are local maximums in the centralized
supply chain.
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